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COMPARATIVE LAW IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA 
M.H. HOEFLICH*
Historians of Hellenistic religion frequently characterize it as one in 
which the teachings and practices of a number of ancient religions were 
both known and influential. Individuals were free to select, from among 
these different religious traditions, those tenets and rituals with which they 
felt most comfortable. They were thus able to fashion completely new 
religions to their liking. I often have thought this notion of syncretism is 
equally useful for understanding the first period in the legal history of our 
nation. 
The Founding Fathers, their children, and their grandchildren found 
themselves living in a new nation where they were not just free to innovate 
legally, but obligated to do so. They had at their disposal, of course, the 
long English tradition of common law. They also had the system of 
Roman law, particularly the works of which they had some knowledge 
from their study of Latin literature, Cicero and Quintilian,1 new 
scholarship on both Roman law and modern civil law coming from 
Germany and France, as well as, basic knowledge of some exotic legal 
systems brought back by the British from their Asian empire.2 Finally, 
they had laws which they had created themselves in the thirteen colonies. 
At the time, lawyers, legislators, and judges also recognized the need to 
create a unique system of laws suitable for their new experiment in 
democracy. Virtually every new state passed legislation formally receiving 
the common law of England as it had existed prior to the Revolution, but 
each state refused to be bound by post-revolutionary statutes or decisions.3 
 * John H. & John M. Kane Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Kansas. The text 
here printed is as delivered at the Centennial Conference of the 1904 Congress of Comparative 
Lawyers held at Washington University School of Law and St. Louis University School of Law in 
October 2004. I would like to thank all those involved in this meeting for their hospitality and their 
useful comments.  
 1. See Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in 
Classical Influence, 73 CLASSICAL J. 313 (1978); Michael Hoeflich, Roman Law and Forensic 
Oratory in Antebellum America, 120 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FUR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, 
ROM. ABT. [JOURNAL OF THE SAVIGNY FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL HISTORY, ROMAN DEPARTMENT] 
189 (2003) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Roman Law and Forensic Oratory]; OLGA TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, 
QUINTILIAN AND THE LAW (2003). 
 2. See generally MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1997) [hereinafter HOEFLICH, 
ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW]. 
 3. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 107–15 (2d ed. 1985). 
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Obviously, this generation of lawyers and judges had been trained in the 
English common law, and they were not going to abandon it completely. 
But, they faced the choice: whether to continue the English legal line or to 
strike out on a new path. 
Influential in their decision-making was a recognition that English 
cases and statutes suffered from several practical disabilities to 
implementation. First, the physical and financial context of English law 
was different from that of the new nation. The English common law 
developed in a context in which property was scarce and labor generally 
cheap. However, in the new American nation, property was cheap and 
plentiful but labor was often scarce. Second, the political wounds of the 
Revolution were slow to heal and were reopened by the War of 1812. 
Therefore, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, the English 
common law was widely seen as the legal system of a tyrannous enemy 
regime. Thus, in the early decades of our national history, there were 
reasons for American jurists to look seriously at other legal systems as 
well as a number of other legal systems at which to look. 
We may categorize antebellum jurists as falling within three groups: 
(1) those who favored a wholesale abandonment of the common law and 
its replacement by a new, uniquely American system, based perhaps on 
Roman or European models; (2) those who favored giving priority to the 
common law system, while recognizing that English precedents and 
statutes would, of necessity, often need to be replaced; and (3) a few hardy 
souls who sought to maintain, as much as possible, the common law 
tradition. It is the members of these first two groups, whom we may label 
as “proto-comparativists,” who most interest us today. 
Before I begin to address in greater detail what I am calling “proto-
comparativism,” I must spend a moment on the definition of comparative 
law as a discipline. Today, the very definition of what constitutes 
comparative law is unsettled.4 For the purpose of this paper, I use a very 
crude definition of comparativist activity, one drawn from early nineteenth 
century sources: an activity is comparativist when an individual makes a 
conscious decision to study a foreign legal source and compare it to a 
native source. When I use this definition I must also clarify that virtually 
no theoretical comparative study occurred during the antebellum period. 
Lawyers and judges approached foreign sources purposefully with an eye 
to deciding whether to adopt such sources into American law or to 
 4. See generally ESIN ÖRÜCÜ, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (2004); PIERRE LEGRAND 
& RODERICK MUNDAY, COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/3
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demonstrate why the Anglo-American common law rules were superior to 
another system’s rules.5
Early American legal culture was awash with foreign law and interest 
in foreign law. Foreign laws and foreign legal thinking impacted virtually 
every facet of the culture. As I have already noted, there were both 
pragmatic and political reasons for this. But whatever the reason, most 
American lawyers found themselves exposed to foreign law to a far 
greater extent than they are today.  
Long before most students would ever encounter a legal text, they 
would be exposed to the basic concepts of Roman law: they studied the 
orations of Cicero as part of their secondary education. These texts were 
particularly interesting because they presented law in a classical 
republican context; perfect for students in the new nation.6 Of the students 
who went on to college, those destined for a career in law or politics 
would likely study rhetoric. In so doing, they would undoubtedly read the 
classical rhetoricians, such as Quintilian, as well as the writings of more 
modern sources, such as the Scottish professor Hugh Blair.7 These works 
focused on forensic rhetoric and were steeped in Roman legal principles. 
The first uniquely American work on rhetoric and oratory, John Quincy 
Adams’s Boyleston Lectures, delivered at Harvard College, were to a large 
extent the first modern American work on legal ethics and explicitly 
compared Roman and American legal practice and practice rules.8 In short, 
by the time a would-be lawyer began his professional legal studies, either 
at a law school or in a law office, the lawyer would already have been 
exposed to Roman law and would have been well prepared to view the 
study of American law with a comparativist’s perspective. 
The nature of early American law practice also helped foster the 
comparativist perspective. Much of the practice of law, particularly in 
major urban centers, centered around trade and commerce. Such practice 
frequently involved transactions either on the high seas or with foreign 
countries. This meant that those attorneys who chose to pursue such 
clients were forced to become familiar with the basic principles of 
admiralty law, a subject which incorporated classical and post-classical 
Roman law as well as modern European civil law. For example, Robert 
 5. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 43–49. 
 6. For a discussion of the importance of Roman models in the early Republic, see M.N.S. 
SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM 31–66 (1994); see also CAROLINE WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF 
CLASSICISM (2002). 
 7. See Hoeflich, Roman Law and Forensic Oratory, supra note 1. 
 8. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LECTURES AND ORATORY DELIVERED TO THE CLASSES OF SENIOR 
AND JUNIOR SOPHISTERS IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1810). 
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Rantoul, a prominent Massachusetts lawyer and politician of the early 
Republic, won praise for his knowledge and use of foreign legal materials 
in his admiralty cases. Those who represented clients engaging in 
international trade also needed knowledge of foreign systems, particularly 
foreign commercial law. This partly explains why texts on foreign 
commercial law found a ready market in the United States during this 
period.9
Of course, mere knowledge of foreign legal materials is not the same as 
the use of these materials in a comparative manner. Indeed, perhaps the 
best evidence of the widespread adoption of the comparative method in 
law during the antebellum period are law books themselves; the 
comparative approach to law is the most common one found in these texts. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, American lawyers found 
themselves with little uniquely American law, either case law or statutes, 
and few law books. Griffith’s Annual Law Register of the United States, 
published in 1822, provides a survey of legal texts published in each of the 
states.10 There are very few books listed, and even those listed tend to be 
either practice guides or short treatises on quite narrow subjects. By the 
1830s, however, law book production had increased enormously. By the 
Civil War, legal texts formed a substantial portion of the new books 
published each year. Joseph Story, who did as much as any jurist to 
contribute to this flood of published law books, actually complained in one 
of his lectures that the flood of legal publications would soon overcome 
the profession and make competent lawyering virtually impossible.11 What 
is most interesting to us about this new wave of American law books is 
that so many of them incorporated the comparative method. 
This incorporation of the comparative method into antebellum 
American law books took two forms. First, the comparative method could 
be used in the text of the work. The best examples of this are the works 
produced by Joseph Story between his appointment as the first Dane 
Professor at Harvard Law School in 1829 and his death in 1846. The Dane 
endowment at Harvard was created by Nathan Dane (after whom the 
school was first named), and he personally suggested that the incumbent to 
the chair produce legal works incorporating foreign law.12 Story took this 
 9. See Michael Hoeflich, Translation and the Reception of Foreign Law in the Antebellum 
United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 753–75 (2002). 
 10. WILLIAM GRIFFITH, ANNUAL LAW REGISTER OF THE UNITED STATES (1822). 
 11. Joseph Story, The Progress of Jurisprudence, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH 
STORY 198, 237 (W.W. Story ed., 1852). 
 12. See CHARLES WARREN, THE HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY 
LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 451 (1908) [hereinafter WARREN]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/3
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instruction seriously, and from his appointment until his death he produced 
a series of Commentaries on primarily private law subjects.13 These works 
cited and used both European law and Roman law in several ways, all 
comparative. Story was, in my opinion, the champion of what may be 
called “partial reception.” Whenever possible, he favored the use of 
Anglo-American precedent. But, he also recognized that there were 
situations in which there was either no precedent or the precedent was 
unsuitable for the unique situation of the new American nation. In these 
cases, Story would look to foreign law for a rule. But, it is quite clear from 
his works that he was not a proponent of blindly replacing Anglo-
American precedent with foreign rules, rather he used foreign law 
comparatively. He measured the common law rule against the foreign rule 
to see which better accommodated the needs of the new nation. If the 
common law rule and the foreign rule were consistent, then he used this 
comparison to show the wisdom of the common law rule. If the common 
law rule and the foreign rule differed and he could justify using the 
common law rule, he would reject the foreign rule and often give his 
reason for doing so. If the common law rule was unsuitable for continued 
use, or if there was no common law rule, only then would he analyze the 
foreign rule, modifying it if necessary and adopting it as a rule of 
American law. In effect, Story used the comparative method as a key tool 
of selective legal reception.14
Story’s inspiration for this approach may well have come, in part, from 
text that is underappreciated by legal historians today: Sir William Jones’s 
Essay on the Law of Bailments.15 Jones was a polymath; he was a scholar 
of Asian languages, a judge in Calcutta, and a prolific author. Early in his 
career he published this historical treatment of the law of bailments 
centered on the famous case of Coggs v. Bernard.16 Jones was fascinated 
by this case because he believed it was a clear example of how English 
law received and was consistent with Roman legal principles.17 His 
analysis in Essay was a sophisticated attempt to both understand the 
process of reception and to show the benefits of the comparative approach 
 13. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1833); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND 
AND AMERICA (1836). 
 14. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 36–43. 
 15. But see David Ibbetson, Sir William Jones as Comparative Lawyer, in SIR WILLIAM JONES 
1746–1794: A COMMEMORATION 21 (Alexander Murray ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (stating 
Sir Jones’s “Essay on the Law of Bailments of 1781 is justifiably regarded as one of the most 
analytical and comparative works on a single legal topic.”). 
 16. Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 379 (1703). 
 17. See Ibbetson, supra note 15. 
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to law and selective reception.18 Jones’s book was one of the first law 
books reprinted in the United States and was widely read.19 Story knew the 
piece exceptionally well and used it to great advantage in his own 
Commentaries on the Law of Bailments, one of the earliest works of his 
Harvard tenure.20
The second form in which one finds the use of the comparative 
method, is in the footnotes to legal texts. The best example is found in one 
of the most widely distributed books on foreign law in antebellum 
America. In 1756, George Harris published his English translation of 
Justinian’s Institutes.21 This was a milestone in the study of Roman law in 
the English-speaking world. It was the first separately published, full 
English translation of the historic post-classical text on Roman law, itself 
derived from an earlier textbook by the jurist Gaius.22 Harris’s translation 
was more than adequate to convey the basic structure and rules of the 
Roman legal system to its English readers. 
Thomas Cooper was a lawyer, chemist, political radical, and follower 
of Joseph Priestly who came to the United States at the end of the 
eighteenth century in self-imposed political exile. He progressed through a 
series of jobs, both legal and scientific, until he became president of South 
Carolina College.23 Cooper took it upon himself to republish an edited 
version of Harris’s translation of Justinian’s Institutes.24 Harris’s 
translation was only lightly footnoted; Cooper added substantial notes, the 
majority of which were comparative in nature. Harris’s translation was not 
aimed at practicing lawyers in search of useable precedent. Cooper’s 
comparative notes transformed his edition into a text that could be used in 
practice. The notes did not only provide American equivalents and 
differences to the Roman rules set out in the texts; they also provided 
additional historical material and referenced other legal systems of 
potential interest. For this reason, it is not at all surprising that Cooper’s 
 18. Id. 
 19. See J. Oldham, The Survival of Sir William Jones in American Jurisprudence, in OBJECTS OF 
ENQUIRY: THE LIFE, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCES OF SIR WILLIAM JONES 92–101 (Garland 
Cannon & Kevin Brine eds., New York University Press 1995). 
 20. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW, supra note 2, at 36–43. 
 21. THE FOUR BOOKS OF JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES (George Harris trans., 1761). 
 22. See THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS (Cornell University Press 1988). 
 23. South Carolina College, located in Columbia, South Carolina, was the predecessor to the 
University of South Carolina. 
 24. For more on Cooper and his translation of the Institutes, see Michael Hoeflich, Vinnius and 
the Anglo-American Legal World, 114 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FUR 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE, ROM. ABT. [JOURNAL OF THE SAVIGNY FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL HISTORY, 
ROMAN DEPARTMENT] 345, 359–61 (1997) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Vinnius]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/3
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edition was frequently cited in American cases on a range of legal topics, 
including admiralty law and commercial law.25 In the antebellum period 
much comparative scholarship was found, not in the text of books, but in 
the notes. This was especially true of English texts reprinted in the United 
States after 1830. 
Naturally, as the decades passed, American law developed greater 
independence from the law of England. More state and federal court 
decisions were published, and more statutes filled the books. By the 
1830s, the United States was developing its own literature and its own 
legal systems. American lawyers still saw themselves as very much a part 
of an Anglo-American legal community and were unwilling to simply give 
this up. Daniel Mayes, in his 1829 Introductory Lecture to the Law Class 
at Transylvania College, bragged to his students that when they graduated 
they would be as well prepared to practice in the courts of Westminster as 
in the courts of Lexington.26 But, American lawyers were equally aware of 
the growing difference between English law and American law and the 
need to treat English law comparatively, at least to some degree. Law 
publishers during this period continued to publish English treatises for the 
American market, but they also recognized that this market demanded that 
these treatises be accompanied by “American annotations.” These 
footnotes provided analogous American cases as well as commentary 
pointing out the similarities and differences between American and 
English holdings. Publishers’ advertisements touted these annotations and 
the utility of these comparative notes. Examples of such annotated English 
texts are common. For instance, Grigg & Elliott, Philadelphia specialist 
law publishers, published an edition of Sir Samuel Toller’s The Law of 
Executors and Administrators in 1834.27 This edition was reprinted from 
the London edition with notes by Francis Whitemarsh. It also contained 
American notes by Edward D. Ingraham, a Philadelphia lawyer and legal 
editor. These were advertised as containing “references to the statutes of 
Pennsylvania, and the Principal American Decisions.”28 The publisher’s 
catalogue advertisement for this book boasted that “the copious notes 
added to this edition by the American editor . . . render it very valuable.”29
 25. Id. at 365–68. 
 26. Daniel Mayes, An Introductory Lecture to the Law Class at Transylvania College, in THE 
GLADSOME LIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE: LEARNING THE LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES 154 (Michael Hoeflich ed., 1989). 
 27. SAMUEL TOLLER, THE LAW OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (Grigg & Elliot eds., 
1834).  
 28. Id. title-page. 
 29. Id. at page 2 of catalog insert. 
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A reader who opened a text like the 1834 Philadelphia reprint of Toller 
was immediately transported into a world of comparative law. The text 
contained the English law, as Toller understood it. The first set of notes 
contained annotations by Whitemarsh, primarily references to English 
cases, decided after Toller wrote the text. A second set of notes by 
Ingraham set out relevant American cases and statutes as well as 
comments contrasting them. Like it or not, any reader of this or similar 
texts was exposed to the comparative method. 
The near universal practice of reprinting English and European texts 
with comparative notes owed its existence to two causes. First, during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, the relative paucity of published 
legal materials in the United States necessitated importation of English 
treatises to supply the American Bar with legal sources. However, bare 
reprints without any American annotations were less useful—and less 
patriotic—than those with American notes. Second, under the Copyright 
Act of 1790, works by foreign authors were not protected under U.S. 
copyright laws.30 Thus, a publisher who simply reprinted an English text 
was liable to have that text pirated by a competitor. American source 
material, on the other hand, was copyrightable. By appending American 
notes publishers were able to copyright their books. Thus, books with such 
notes were more economically viable than those without. 
The publication of comparative legal materials in the United States 
during the antebellum period would not have been possible without a 
cadre of lawyers capable of translating and annotating foreign materials. 
Interestingly, there was such a cadre, but it was quite small. Some were 
immigrants to the United States: Thomas Cooper was an Englishman;31 
Peter Stephen Du Ponceau was French by origin;32 and Charles Follen, the 
first professor of German at Harvard and lecturer in Roman law at Harvard 
Law School, emigrated from Germany.33 Others were native born. Edward 
Ingraham was a prominent Philadelphia lawyer who made a career of 
annotating English texts for the American market.34
 30. See MEREDITH L. MCGILL, AMERICAN LITERATURE AND THE CULTURE OF REPRINTING 
1834–1853 (2003) (detailing the vast industry of reprinting foreign works in the antebellum United 
States). 
 31. DUMAS MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER (1961). 
 32. See Jennifer Henderson, A Blaze of Reputation and the Echo of a Name: The Legal Career of 
Peter Stephen Du Ponceau in Post-Revolutionary Philadelphia (2004) (M.A. thesis, Florida State 
University), available at http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/thesis/submitted/etd-07122004-134112/unrestricted/ 
thesis_henderson.pdf. 
 33. See CHARLES FOLLEN & ELIZA LEE CABOT FOLLEN, THE WORKS OF CHARLES FOLLEN WITH 
A MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE (1842). 
 34. See Edward Ingraham, Popular Portraits with Pen and Pencil, in UNITED STATES MAGAZINE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/3
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Other factors were at play in the spread of comparative thinking during 
this period. One important source of this movement was the rise of 
university affiliated legal education at such places as Harvard and 
Transylvania College. One may speculate as to why these early law 
schools took a comparative approach to law. In part, this may be due to the 
work of early legal educational writers such as David Hoffman, who 
recommended a comparative approach in his Course of Legal Studies, first 
published in 1817 and reprinted in 1836.35 Another source of this is surely 
Nathan Dane’s suggestion to Joseph Story that he include comparative 
materials in his teaching and writing.36 A third source for this impulse, 
often overlooked, may well have been the need for these early university-
based law schools to establish a market niche in American legal education. 
When Harvard, Transylvania, Virginia, and other universities established 
law schools, the dominant form of legal education in the United States was 
still apprenticeship, which had several major advantages. It was relatively 
inexpensive, it was local, and it often required a relatively short time 
actually in residence. In a period in which requirements for admission to 
the Bar were loose, these were significant advantages. The new law 
schools had none of these advantages. They were expensive (Harvard cost 
$100 per year in 1829), they required students to come to Cambridge, and 
students generally spent at least a year there. In order to win students, 
university-based law schools had to offer something apprenticeships could 
not. The law schools advertised that they offered a “scientific” approach to 
the law as well as extensive law libraries and numerous lectures. At the 
heart of the “scientific” approach was the notion that law was a set of 
rational principles that could be learned and applied.37 This led to the 
comparison of legal systems to discover universal rules when they existed, 
and, when they did not, to compare the various rules to determine which 
were the best when measured against each other. 
A second factor, which helped foster the comparative approach to the 
law during this period, was the remarkable progress being made in 
German law, especially legal history and comparative law. American 
periodicals were filled with accounts of German legal research. General 
periodicals like the North American Review carried articles on the latest 
AND DEMOCRATIC REVIEW 77–81 (1849), available at http://cdl.library.cornell.edu. 
 35. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDIES (1817). 
 36. WARREN, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Michael H. Hoeflich, Introduction to THE GLADSOME LIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE: 
LEARNING THE LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES 8 
(Michael H. Hoeflich ed., 1989). 
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legal progress in Germany. The American Jurist listed new law books 
published in Europe. Young American lawyers seeking greater legal 
expertise studied in Germany, particularly at the University of Gottingen. 
Established American jurists like Joseph Story and Hugh Swinton Legare 
sought out German legal scholars as correspondents.38 As German 
jurisprudence discovered the comparative approach, Americans became 
increasingly interested in this perspective. 
Finally, another factor that played an increasingly important role as the 
century progressed, was the rise of European colonial empires. The rise of 
comparative law studies in England was tied intimately to the rise of the 
British colonial empires.39 Schools like Haileybury College, established to 
train administrators for the East India Company, were centers for 
comparative legal study.40 Colonial administrators had to know both 
English law and the native laws to govern effectively. Some of the most 
important English comparative lawyers of the nineteenth century, Sir 
William Jones and Sir Henry Maine to name but two, were former colonial 
administrators. This interest in colonial laws led to the publication of 
studies of books on these exotic legal systems. These books made their 
way to the American market where they were widely distributed. 
A good example of this phenomenon is Nathaniel Brassey Halhed’s A 
Code of Gentoo Laws, published in London in 1777.41 The book was 
prepared at the direction of Warren Hastings, the then Governor-General 
of Fort William in Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India 
Company. The first paragraph of Halhed’s introduction exhibits his 
understanding of the relationship between knowledge of the native laws 
and the success of the British colonial enterprise: 
The importance of the commerce of India, and the advantages of a 
territorial establishment in Bengal, have at length awakened the 
attention of the British legislature to every circumstance that may 
conciliate the affections of the natives or ensure stability to the 
acquisition. Nothing can so favorably conduce to these two points 
as a well-timed toleration in matters of religion, and an adoption of 
 38. Michael Hoeflich, Transatlantic Friendships and the German Influence on American Law in 
the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 599 (1987). 
 39. A more in-depth discussion of the relationship between the rise of the British colonial empire 
and comparative law is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 40. RICHARD SYMONDS, OXFORD AND EMPIRE (1986); see also Report from the Select 
Committee on Legal Education, 10 BRIT. PARLAMENTARY PAPERS 1, 46–56 (Aug. 25, 1846). 
 41. NATHANIEL HALHED, A CODE OF GENTOO LAWS, OR, ORDINATIONS OF THE PUNDITS 
(1777). 
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such original institutes of the country, as do not immediately clash 
with the laws or interests of the conquerors.42
The only means of accomplishing the task laid out by Halhed was, of 
course, comparing of the native laws with those of Great Britain. Once this 
comparison was completed, it was inevitable that the virtues of the 
comparative method would be self-evident.  
The extensive Anglo-American trade in legal texts ensured that 
Halhed’s book was widely available in the United States. Copies were 
listed for sale by most of the major law booksellers of the antebellum 
period. Both individual and institutional library catalogues list the work as 
contained in collections. The extensive influence of books, like Halhed’s, 
in the United States is difficult to estimate, but the contemporary 
American interest in such books is undeniable. 
These developments in comparative legal thinking came to an end with 
the Civil War. New conditions in the post-war world led to new questions, 
new approaches, and new answers.43 I hope to impress upon readers that 
the comparative approach to law was far from unknown to American 
lawyers and jurists in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that its 
growth and development was brought about not simply by academic 
curiosity, but, rather, by perceived, practical needs. 
 42. Id. at 9. 
 43. The evolution of comparative legal thinking in the aftermath of the Civil War is a topic for 
another day. 
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